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SOCIO-ECONOMIC BUDGETARY CONTRASTS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE EFFECT 
OF ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL REGIMES 
By Robert E. Looney 
One area that has received scant attention in the literature is the 
effect of alternative political systems on the setting of budgetary 
priorities in developing countries. While there has been a considerable 
anecdotal discussion of this issue, little or no empirical work has been 
undertaken. Using the simple dichotomy between civilian and military 
regimes, it appears that significant differences in budgetary allocations 
exist. Interestingly enough it appears that military regimes are less 
likely to reduce economic allocations during periodsof budgetary 
stringency. In contrast, civilian regimes in similar situations are more 
inclined to preserve social allocations. 
Despite the explosion of studies on the impact of defense 
expenditures on developing country growth, no clear and 
simple answer has emerged to the question: does defense spend-
ing have an impact on economic performance? Depending on 
the researcher, the answer could be yes, maybe, or no, with 
different degrees of confidence. There is also considerable 
disagreem~t about the nature of such impact, as may exists. 
Suggesting a reciprocal relationship between military outlay 
and economic performance, some analysts feel that as current 
defense spending can affect foture economic performance, 
current or expected economic conditions can influence govern-
mental decisions about how much to spend on defense. ( 1) 
As Chan(2) noted, we need to redress the research problems 
in this area into separate questions and ask: 1) what kind of 
impact? 2) how does this impact occur? 3) what are the relevant 
measures of defense burden and the relevant measures of eco-
nomic performance? 4) when is this impact more likely to be 
felt? 5) which countries are more likely to experience this 
impact? 6) what are the opportunity costs of this impact? 
7) which domestic groups and areas are more likely to benefit 
or to be hurt by this impact? and 8) what are the policy impli-
cations of this impact? 
The purpose of this paper is to make a first attempt at 
answering several of these questions l>Y integrating two major 
areas of research - the defense growth debate and the defense 
budgetary trade-offs debate - that despite their rather obvious 
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connection have been undertaken quite independently from one 
another. More specifically, the analysis below shows that: 
1. When examining Third World countries as subsets -
those governed by military regimes or those having civilian 
governments - one finds sharply diverging results as to the 
impact of the military burden on growth. 
2. The budgetary trade-off between defense and non-
def ense expenditures differs considerably depending on 
whether a country has a civilian government or military 
regime; 
3. Differences in the budgetary process in military and 
civilian regimes are likely to account in part for the con-
trasting impact that increased military burdens have with 
respect to each group of countries. 
The main contribution of the analysis below to the ongoing 
defense/growth debate is the identification of a clear and un-
ambiguous mechanism leading from changes in the military bur-
den to variations in budgetary allocations to growth inducing 
categories and hence growth. Several of these linkages have 
been alluded to by various researchers, but none have been 
quantitatively identified. 
The Defense-Growth Debate 
There are many hypotheses one can develop about the 
manner in which increased defense spending may affect growth 
favorably or unfavorably. Rothchild,(3) Benoit,(4) Deger and 
Sen, ( 5) Frederiksen and Looney, ( 6) Looney, ( 7) Faini, Annez 
and Taylor,(8) Leontief and Duchin.(9) and Lim,(10) Deger 
and Smith,(11) Biswas and Ram,(12), have advanced a variety 
of arguments. 
Despite the diversity in their approaches and arguments, 
most researchers probably recognize two important mechanisms 
through which military expenditures may affect economic 
growth: (13) 
1. the military sector may for a variety of reasons 
generate positive or negative externalities for the rest of 
the economy; and 
2. there may be important factor productivity dif-
ferences between the two sectors .• 
In his seminal work Benoit, ( 14) after controlling for the 
effects of investment and bilateral economic assistance, found 
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(for the period 1960-65) a positive and significant relationship 
between the defense burden (defense expenditures share in 
gross national product) and the growth in civilian GNP. On the 
other hand, over the 1950-65 period he did not find a statisti-
cally significant relationship between the defense burden and 
growth. 
In Benoit's view, the positive correlation in the shorter time 
period indicated that military expenditures were more likely to 
be the cause rather than the effect of faster economic growth. 
His actual conclusions, however were stated in rather cautious 
and tentative terms: (15) 
We have been unable to establish whether the net 
growth effects of defense expenditures have been positive 
or not. On the basis of all the evidence we suspect that 
they have been positive ... but we have not been able to 
prove this. Heavy defense expenditure does not, however, 
appear to have been associated with lower growth rates, 
even after adjusting for differences in foreign aid receipts 
and investment rates and this in itself is surprising. 
The positive relationship found by Benoit between the 
defense burden and economic growth could however be spuri-
ous because economic growth could be caused by the inflow of 
other types of foreign resources not just aid. There has also 
been considerable skepticism regarding Benoit's explanation 
that rising military expenditures stimulate private demand and 
encourage fuller utilization of production facilities. Several 
critics have argued that the main problem facing developing 
countries is not inadequate demand and underutilized capacity, 
but severe production bottlenecks in precisely those industrial 
sectors that are likely to be further strained to cope with addi-
tional defense demands. Finally, several analysts have objected 
to Benoit's structural specification of the analytic model link-
ing defense expenditures to growth and his measure of the 
defense burden used in his model. ( 16) 
Although the studies that attempt to verify Ben£>it's results 
do not always agree among themselves, they have not, on the 
whole, supported his conclusion. Some failed to find any 
strong and systematic relationship between defense spending 
and economic growth in the Third World. Others actually dis-
covered a significant negative relati<'lnship between these vari-
ables, either for developing countries as a whole, or at least for 
some subsets of countries. While some analysts found a positive 
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relationship for several countries, such as the OPEC coun-
tries, or a somewhat even larger group of unconstrained coun-
tries, (17) this phenomenon appears more the exception than 
the rule. None of the validating studies would support Benoit's 
observation that the positive impact of military expenditures 
on growth is a widespread phenomenon among developing 
countries. On the other hand, the evidence in support of a 
negative relationship between defense spending and economic 
growth has usually produced modest (albeit statistically signi-
ficant trade-off) and sometimes is derived from very small 
samples of subsets of the developing countries. ( 18) 
As noted above, the major deficiency common to most of 
these studies is their omission, except in a very general sort of 
way of the specification of a mechanism through which mili-
tary burdens impact on growth. Benoit's resort to Keynesian 
demand creation effects for net positive impacts and Frederik-
sen and Looney's assertion of the net negative impacts on over-
all growth stemming from the appropriation of scarce foreign 
exchange by the military, remain as the standard explanations 
for the observed impacts of defense expenditures on growth in 
the Third World. ( 19) 
Completely isolated from the defense growth debate, a num-
ber of fesearchers have been simultaneously attempting to 
determine whether increases in defense expenditures in Third 
World public sector budgets .systematically displace various 
socio-economic allocations. 
To date analyses of budgetary trade-off: (20) 
1. have concentrated almost exclusively on the devel-
oped countries; 
2. have proceeded from a variety of theoretical per-
spectives; 
3. have employed an array of methological approaches; 
and 
4. have produced conflicting and mixed results. 
Peroff and Warren(21) conclude that "the number of studies 
which indicates the existence of a tradeoff approximates the 
number that shows that none exists." (22) 
While the bulk of the research on budgetary trade-offs be-
tween defense and social program expenditures has focussed 
on the industrial countries of Notth America and Western 
Europe, Hayes,(23) has suggested that the problem of trade-offs 
between defense spending and social investment "is perhaps 
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even more serious in the developing countries." (24) 
In a major United Nations report the Secretary General 
argued that when the needs of economic development are so 
pressing in the developing countries, it is 
... a disturbing thought that these countries have found 
it necessary to increase military spending so speedily, 
particularly when their per capita income is so low." 
The study concluded that military expenditures undoubtedly 
absorb resources that are: 
... substantial enough to make a considerable differ-
ence, both in the level of investment for civil purposes, 
and in the volume of resources which can be devoted to 
improving man's lot through social and other services. (25) 
The clear implication of this United Nations report is that 
increased defense spending may have negative consequences for 
socio-economic development programs such as health, educa-
tion, and economic services. 
Clearly, the basic criticism leveled against defense expendi-
tures is that they reduce the total resources available for eco-
nomic development programs such as health, education, and 
economic services. 
Therefore, the basic and rather obvious criticism leveled 
against defense expenditures is the usual guns vs. butter 
dichotomy i.e., that increases expenditures reduce the total 
resources available for economic and social development. The 
growing need on the part of developing countries for both 
domestic and foreign resources could be met, it is argued, 
by freeing some of the current allocations for defense, especi-
ally where economic difficulties demand major structural 
adjustments. Critics of defense expenditures argue that alloca-
tions in this area complicate the task of adjustment, since they 
escape analysis and scrutiny while using up high opportunity 
resources. (26) 
While this argument appears sound in a zero-sum world, in 
actuality these fears are somewhat surprisingly not always 
borne out. For example, in her analysis of budgetary alloca-
tions to defense and a variety of socio-economic programs in 
Brazil between 1950 and 1967, Hayes(27) concluded that 
military spending did not necessarily yield negative conse-
quences for social and economic iIWestment. She found that 
substitutions between military allocations and allocations to 
other sectors do occur frequently, but that the burden of these 
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substitutions is distributed across all categories at one time or 
another. Further she judged that when they do occur, these 
substitutions are not severe. Finally she determined that (at 
least in the Brazilian case) a zero-sum situation did not always 
occur between defense and non-defense allocations in the 
sense that defense spending was often accompanied by sub-
stantial increases in spending for infrastructure and other 
development related activities as the central government ex-
panded its overall level of expenditures. 
She did find on the other hand that increased defense spend-
ing has some negative effects on social spending, but that this 
"was mild because social investment was not a major priority of 
any of the regimes examined." (28) Nevertheless, Hayes report-
ed a correlation of -0.23 between defense and social develop-
ment (education, health, welfare) expenditures measured as 
percentages of the total public budget. In addition, she found 
a -0.28 correlation between spending on military personnel and 
social development expenditures. Although "theoretical general-
izations cannot be made and hypotheses cannot be accepted or 
rejected on the basis of evidence from a single case,(29) Hayes 
research seems to indicate at most some potential competition 
between military expenditures and socio-economic budgetary 
allocations. 
Even more surprising (and counter-intuitive) was the finding 
of Ames and Goff (30) (using a pooled cross-section series data 
for 18 Latin American countries for the period 1940-1968) 
that education and defense spending tend to increase and 
decrease simultaneously. Correlating defense and education 
spending in absolute terms, as percentage changes from year to 
year and relative total budget and gross domestic product for 
individual years (and regimes), Ames and Goff found rather 
high positive correlations between defense and education 
expenditures measured relative to the total budget. Mindful of 
serious auto-correlation problems in their analysis, Ames and 
Goff concluded that although other (presumably unidentifiable) 
policy areas may lose out in the budgetary process, neither edu-
cation nor defense "gains at the expense of the other." ( 31) 
In summary, as in the defense/growth debate, there is con-
flicting evidence about the interaction of defense with other 
growth inducing variables. (32) Wh1le the studies cited above 
are suggestive as to the potential budgetary trade-offs between 
defense and socio-economic allocations, they are somewhat 
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unsatisfactory in that the manner in which the overall composi-
tion of the budget is determined is never explicitly dealt with. 
Can we go one step further and delineate the types of regimes 
that are likely to systematically reduce certain growth inducing 
allocations for the sake of increased defense expenditures? The 
literature on Third World civilian and military regimes seems to 
suggest that this dichotomy may be a useful starting point 
for examining the manner in which defense allocations affect 
the composition of socio-economic expenditures in the public 
sector budget. 
Budgetary Priorities in Military and Civilian Regimes 
A frequently stated and widely believed maxim of eco-
nomic development holds that strong central planning under 
an authoritarian regime is necessary for an underdeveloped 
country to achieve rapid economic growth. Hielbroner for 
example states that "only political leadership of the most 
forceful kind can ... carry the Great Ascent along." (33) He 
goes on to say that: · 
. . . in most of the underdeveloped nations the choice 
for the command post of development is apt to lie be-
tween a military dictatorship and a left wing civilian 
dictatorship ... the logic of events points to the formation 
of economic systems and political regimes which will seek 
to impose development on their peoples. (34) 
Interestingly while this theme is so pervasive in the litera-
ture the assertion is rarely supported by definitive data of any 
kind.(35) In fact existing empirical studies of regime type, 
public policy and policy outcomes conducted so far tend to 
support the conclusion that regime differences have little or 
no impact on public policy. 
The first of these studies, conducted by Eric Nordlinger(36) 
was based on a population of seventy-four countries. Nordlinger 
attempted to test the relationship between military strength and 
seven indicators of economic and social change. These indica-
tors included relatively standard measures of economic change 
such as the rate of growth of per capita GNP, as well as some-
what more unusual subjective indices such as leadership com-
mitment to economic development. 
Finding relatively weak correlalions between military 
strength and the various indicators of socio-economic develop-
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ment (except for the least developed countries of his sample), 
Nordlinger concluded(37) that within a particular social and 
political context (when there is hardly a middle class to speak 
of and when workers and peasants have not been politically 
mobilized) military regimes sometimes allow or even encourage 
economic modernization. However he felt his results irtdicated 
that in other contexts (i.e., outside sub-Saharan Africa) officer 
politicians were apparently unconcerned with the realiza-
tion of economic change and reform. It should be noted that 
Nordlinger explicitly ruled out the claim that civilian regimes 
are necessarily more successful in carrying out modernizing 
changes. (38) 
Nordlinger's conclusions were reconsidered by Jackman(39) 
who applied a covariance analysis method to Nordlinger's data 
base (as well as a new set of data covering the decade 1960-
1970 for seventy seven Third World countries). The use of a 
more sophisticated statistical approach led Jackman to conclude 
in contrast to Nordlinger that: "military intervention in the 
policies of the Third World has no unique effects on social 
change, regardless of either the level of economic development 
or geographical region." ( 40) 
Based on an identical sample of 115 countries McKinlay and 
Cohan ··reached conclusions that were very similar to Jack-
man's. In the first of these studies, McKinlay and Cohan(41) 
compared the performance .of military and civilian regimes 
over the 1951-70 period, using indicators of annual change in 
percapita GNP, cost of living, food production, exports, pri-
mary education, military spending and military size. Like Nord-
linger, they found that military regimes performed significantly 
better than civilian regimes in the poorest countries although 
the evidence also suggests that in Latin America military 
regimes perform somewhat better than civilian ones. How-
ever, McKinlay and Cohan concluded that "military regimes 
do not in aggregate form a distinctive regime type in terms of 
performance."(42) They found that the rate of growth of 
primary education was the only overall significant performance 
difference between military and civilian governments. 
In their second ( 43) study McKinlay and Cohan covering 
1961-70 used different data and statistical techniques to arrive 
at the same basic conclusion. In this study, McKinlay and 
Cohan found evidence that military regimes tended to occupy 
a weaker international trading position than their civilian 
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counterparts, but that their economic performance rates, mea-
sured in terms of the rate of growth of per capita GNP, cost 
of living and exports, compared favorably with non-military 
regimes. ( 44) Military regimes were clearly distinguished from 
their civilian counterparts only by their lower levels of political 
activity and higher levels of political change. In short the gen-
eral conclusion reached by Nordlinger and McKinlay-Cohan 
were that the military regimes were not socially reformist 
for the most part while· being highly repressive politically. 
Although Nordlinger found some evidence for higher economic 
growth by African military regimes, this was not attributed to 
inherent regime capabilities. The latter authors discerned in 
the socio-economic area that "the military regimes systems 
do score consistently lower than the non-military regime sys-
tems." ( 45) And while noting that the variations were not of 
sufficient magnitude to warrant statistical confidence, they 
reiterated that "what differences do exist place the military 
regimes in the weaker position." ( 46) 
Sarkesian reports ( 4 7) on analogous, yet more striking find-
ings by Park and Abolfathi who: 
. . . analyze military involvement in domestic politics 
and its consequences for foreign and defense policies. Five 
indicators of military influence were operationalized and 
correlated with approximately sixty variables across 150 
countries (ca. 1970). Among other things, Park and 
Abolfathi found that 'countries with a strong political 
rating of the military tend to spend a higher proportion 
of their governmental revenues for defense'. They also 
found that health and education expenditures tend to 
decrease as military influence increases. 
Using the 1960-73 time frame, Ravenhi11(48) was unable to 
find statistically significant performances for African military 
and civilian governments. Yet he adds the caveat that: 
... this type of research design by aggregating the per-
formance data for all 'military' regimes, obscures the sub-
stantial differences in performance between regimes 
classified within either the civilian or military group-
ings. (49) 
Along these same lines Philippe Schmitter,(50) using both 
cross section and longitudinal data, ctmcluded that no regime 
type was exclusively linked with developmental success (as 
measured by such indicators of performance as average annual 
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percentage increases in inflation, exports, industrial production, 
and per capita GNP). Military and civilian regimes were slightly 
more successful in curtailing inflation, increasing foreign ex-
change earnings, and promoting economic growth, especially in 
industry; however she felt her results indicated that environ-
mental factors, particularly dependence on foreign capital, aid 
and trade, were more important in understanding performance 
variations than regime type. Regime type only appeared rele-
vant for understanding variations in government allocations 
(outputs) as distinct from system performance (outcomes). In 
particular Schmitter found that, as opposed to their civilian 
counterparts, military regimes in Latin America tended to spend 
less of social welfare, relied more heavily on indirect taxation as 
a source of government revenue, and extracted fewer resources 
for the pursuit of public polities. It should be noted however 
that most of her correlations· between regime type and policy 
outputs were weak, supporting the view that regime differences 
are relatively unimportant for understanding policy differences 
in Latin Amercia. 
Margaret Daly Hayes ( 51) detailed work on longitudinal 
changes in Brazilian national expenditures also cast doubt on 
the relevance of regime differences for explaining variations in 
economic goals and policy outputs. Compared to their military 
counterparts, civilian governments in the 1950-67 period were 
more likely to spend money on social development and the 
civilian bureaucracy and less likely to spend funds on military 
equipment; but all regimes in this period gave priority to nation-
al development with an emphasis on infrastructure develop-
ment. In short, her analysis indicated that ecological considera-
tions, particularly GNP, political conflict, primary export 
earnings, inflation and debt service rather than regime type 
explained most of the variation in expenditure patterns over 
time. 
In summary, recent empirical research tends to suggest that 
underlying socio-economic conditions impose such basic 
constraints on political actors that it makes little difference 
whether they are civilian or military. Similar conclusions have 
been reached by studies employing very different units of 
analysis and research strategies. However, before concluding 
that the effort by researchers to \:xplain the causes of regime 
variations has been a total waste of time, it is of interest to look 
at those studies that have c.oncentrated more on differences 
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between regime type, budgetary priorities and socio-economic 
trade-offs associated with increased levels of military expendi-
tures. 
In the first of these studies, Kennedy (52) found that in the 
1960s military regimes devoted a larger share of their budgets 
(twenty one percent) on the average to the armed forces than 
civilian governments (fourteen percent): (53) 
Military governments in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Latin America allocated about double the percentage 
allocated by non-military governments on defense out of 
state budgets. 
Except in Latin America, Kennedy found military spending 
to be uncompetitive with health and educational expenditures. 
Only in Asia and to a lesser degree Latin America did civilian 
governments spend more on education and health than military 
regimes. It was about the same in Africa while in the Middle 
East the largely traditional monarchic civilian autocracies spent 
even less upon such welfare activities than did the military. 
Even more pronounced negative relationships with welfare 
were reported by Morrison and Stevenson ( 5 4) for military 
expenditures. In Asian and Latin American countries there was 
a moderate inverse correlation with economic growth and a 
strong positive one with political instability. Weaker relation-
ships were reported for Africa, where many of the countries 
had only recently gained formal independence. 
Tannahill's policy analysis(55) of ten South American 
countries between 1948 and 1967 revealed that the military did 
slightly better in such areas as economic growth, manufacturing 
production, exports and inflation, while civilians were margin-
ally superior with respect to indirect taxation. His overall co~­
clusion was that: (56) 
The major difference in the performance of military and 
civilian governments, however, is a political one. On every 
indicator of political responsiveness to demands for 
reform - government sanctions, social welfare spending 
and direct taxes - the military as rulers opt for more 
conservative or more repressive policies than do their 
civilian counterparts. We must conclude with Nordlinger, 
then, that military rulers are commonly unconcerned with 
the realization of reform and where there are civilian 
organizations pressing for such change, the military pur-
posefully oppose them. 
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Even more than Kennedy, Tannahill discovered a salient 
distinction in the vital area of social welfare spending where 
approximately 23 percent of civilian budgets fell into this 
category, while for the military regimes, it was slightly in excess 
of 1 7 percent. Furthermore, this was the only policy differenti-
ation that was statistically significant. 
The validity of Tannahill's findings is underscored by Dick-
son's (5 7) cross-national and longitudinal assessment of trade-
offs for the same countries during the 1961-70 period. He con-
cludes that: (58) 
1. military regimes appear to have been more fiscally 
conservative than civilian ones; 
2. civilian regimes appear to have been more develop-
mentally oriented than military ones; 
3. military regimes were inclined to spend less and run 
lower deficits, even though they spent more on the mili-
tary; 
4. military regimes showed a lower rate of increase in 
the cost of living and maintained a stronger international 
liquidity position for the central bank; and 
5. civilian regimes for their part, spent more, did more 
for edJ;tcation and effected higher savings and investment 
rates, although the military had an edge in electrical 
production. 
Unfortunately the only direct welfare or reform indicator 
employed by Dickson was public education expenditures. Yet 
using an earlier 1950-67 time frame Schmitter(59) found that 
military rule in Latin America was associated with higher 
regressiveness in tax structures, although frequent military inter-
vention was associated with higher economic growth rates. 
Schmitter entered the caveat that: 
We have shown rather convincingly that in some pene-
trated societies such as those in Latin America, exogenous 
variables - especially the level of commercial and financial 
dependence on the United States - do explain a wide 
range of outcomes, including the rate of GNP increase. ( 60) 
Much of the empirical work to date is less in agreement with 
the expectations of those who imputed a modernizing role to 
the military in nation-building than it is with Heeger's ( 61) con-
clusion that: • 
The military decade ( 1965-7 5) that has just ended in 
Africa and Asia has been highly disillusioning. Contrary to 
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most scholars' earlier image of the military as a highly 
modern force, able to transfer its organizational and 
technical skills to the art of governing, most military 
regimes have hindered the development of their countries. 
Explanations for their incapacity abound. Military organi-
zation is now seen as incapable of dealing with the more 
elusive problems of development, the military is seen as 
preoccupied with its own class interests; military rulers 
are described as so anti-political as to frustrate their efforts 
to gain popular support. 
A similar conclusion for most developing countries is articu-
lated by Ball(62) who notes "It is increasingly accepted that for 
these countries high rates of economic growth, investment and 
employment are inversely related to high levels of military ex-
penditure." She assesses the effects of militarization upon eco-
nomic development as being more negative than positive. (63) 
Along the lines Debelko and McCormick(64) examined 
budgetary substitution effects between military, health and edu-
cational expenditures reported by 75 countries in various parts 
of the world between 1950 and 1972. Their regression analysis 
was consistent with the opportunity cost theses although the 
coefficients tended to be weak - yet this was less the case for 
education and health. 
When they controlled for regime type, the most pronounced 
substitution effects were obtained in the case of military 
regimes: "it is safe to conclude that military spending in person-
alist regimes has had the harshest impact on spending for edu-
cation and health." (65) 
Opportunity costs were only marginally affected by econom-
ic development levels, although these tended to increase for 
education among the more developed countries, while they 
declined for the least developed which may have been impacted 
more by foreign aid programs. 
Analyzing coups and military expenditures between 1963 
and 1971, Whynes(66) finds that in every case there was a post-
coup rise in military expenditures. 
An earlier and longer term association between military inter-
vention and enlarged budgetary shares was also reported by 
Thompson(67) who discerned for the 1946-66 period "that 
years in which military coups occufred were more likely to 
coincide with years in which relative defense expenditures 
increased, not decreased." ( 68) While this may well have reflect-
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ed abortive attempts by incumbent governments to buy off 
military support for conspirators, Thompson warns against 
casual assumptions. Nevertheless, he stressed that "more gen-
erally it would appear that there is a tendency for relative 
defense expenditures to rise in the years after a coup, especially 
after successful coups."(69) The same holds for subsequent 
increases in arms imports and weapons stocks. 
In general therefore, the empirical literature has been some-
what more successful in identifying differences by regime type 
with regard to budgetary priorities and socio-economic trade-
offs associated with increased defense expenditures than with 
detecting major differences in the macro-economic performance 
of civilian and military regimes. However the literature to date 
remains unsatisfactory in that if in fact there are major dif-
ferences in budgetary priorities between military and civilian 
regimes, the consequences should be clearly reflected in some 
sort of economic performances measure. Yet this does not 
appear to be the case. 
As noted above, the purpose of the empirical analysis that 
follows is to shed new insights into the controversy surrounding 
the policy impact of regime type, by examining the impact 
military expenditures have on over-all economic growth in both 
military and civilian regimes. In order to account for the results 
obtained from this exercise, additional tests are performed to 
determine whether civilian or ,military regimes have different 
defense-socio-economic budgetary trade-offs. 
In short the analysis below attempts to integrate three main 
themes in the literature: the impact of defense expenditures on 
economic growth, the manner in which Third World budgetary 
trade-offs between defense and socio-economic allocations are 
resolved and the differing economic performance of military 
and civilian regimes. 
Definitional Considerations 
The definition of militarism is fraught with difficulties and 
controversy. The usual approach is to define militarism as 
implying a dominance of the military over the civilian, an undue 
preponderance of military demands, and emphasis on military 
considerations, spirit, ideals and values. This definition is con-
ceptually broad in scope and it is prbbably difficult to compare 
nations on this basis. (70) More specific is the description 
provided by M. Thee: (71) 
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... under the term 'militarism' I assume such symptoms 
as a rush to armaments, the growing role of the military 
... in national and international affairs, the use of force as 
an instrument of prevalent and political power, and the 
increasing influence of the military in civilian affairs. 
There are clearly a number of operational problems in using 
this definition to categorize countries as either military or 
civilian. 
Using a different line of approach Sivard,(72) claims that for 
a sample of 104 developing countries, 56 have some form of 
explicit or implicit military control. Militarism is identified by 
one or more of the following criteria: 
1. key political leadership by military officers; 
2. existence of a state of martial law; 
3. extrajudicial authority exercised by security forces; 
4. lack of central political control over large sections of 
the country where official or unofficial security forces 
rule; and 
5. control by foreign military forces(73) 
Clearly these attributes are empirical in that they can be con-
firmed for a particular society. 
Because it was operational, Sivard's approach to regime 
classification was adopted for the analysis that follows. ( 7 4) 
Empirical Results 
Starting with a simple Benoit type framework, the impact of 
the military burden (here defined as the average level of military 
expenditures per capita over the 1970-81 period) on over-all 
economic growth,(75) (GDPG) for the period 1970-82 was first 
examined. 
Benoit's basic equation was modified somewhat to take into 
account factors identified in subsequent studies as having an 
impact on overall economic growth. These variables included: 
1. The share of public consum:ption (PCB) in GDP was 
included - presumably reflecting potential "crowding 
out" private sector investment and hence reduced over all 
rates of investment. (76) The expected sign on this variable 
is negative. 
2. The growth of investment ~GDIGB) over the 1970-
82 period was used for the investment term. Empirically 
this variable gave results superior to Benoit's measure -
the share of investment in GDP. 
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3. The rate of growth of exports over the 1970-82 
period was included to control for the relaxation of the 
foreign exchange constraint in economies such as the 
OPEC countries i.e. higher rates of growth in these coun-
tries may simply stem from increased export earnings 
which in turn make an increased volume of funds available 
for modernization and expansion of the military. (77) 
4. The average level of military expenditures over the 
1970-82 period were used to capture the impact of the 
military burden on overall economic growth. ( 7 8) 
For the military regimes: 
GDPG = 0.65 GDIGB - 0.27 PCB+ 0.22 ME+ 0.05 EGB 
(6.94) (-2.84) (2.20) (0.48) 
r2 = 0. 765; F = 23.60; DF = 33 
(1.65) (-2.34) 
r2 = 0.621; F = 15.13; DF = 51 
For the civilian regimes: 
GDPG = 0. 78 GDIGB - 0.25 PCB - 0.61 ME + 0.42 EGB 
(5.25) (-0.36) (-4.09) (3.25) 
r2 = 0.666; F = 11.45; DF = 27 
For military regimes, real GDP growth over the 1970-82 per-
iod was found to be largely a function of the rate of real growth 
in investment over the same time period (the regression coeffici-
ents are standardized estimates), with military expenditures 
impacting positively on over-all growth. Civilian regimes, in con-
trast, experienced strong negative effects on growth resulting 
from increased levels of military expenditures. 
Clearly, military regimes - everything else being equal -
undoubtedly have greater budgetary flexibility i.e. they can 
determine expenditure priorities without the degree of popular 
support associated with the budgetary process in most civilian 
regimes. Whether or not there is any systematic bias in the way 
military and civilian regimes determine their defense non-
defense budgetary trade-offs, may ultimately account for the 
impact defense expenditures have on overall growth in their 
respective economies. More specifically, do military or civilian 
regimes significantly and systematicaMy reduce growth inducing 
budgetary allocations to accommodate increased military 
burdens? 
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Budgetary trade-offs were examined by constructing a simple 
model of the form: share [ x] - share [defense] + control vari-
able. Where share [x(79)] is the share of a non-defense category 
in the government's budget. Control variables were used to 
improve the specification of the regressive model, thus obtain-
ing less biased estimates. The control variable selected was the 
share of public expenditure in GNP in 1981.(80) For the results 
for the military regimes see Chart One. 
For the military regimes increased defense expenditures tend 
to be associated with somewhat higher levels of public sector 
services, health and education expenditures and allocations for 
the transport sector. Over-all, defense expenditures do not 
appear to significantly reduce the share of the budget for eco-
nomic development, social expenditures, expenditures for 
welfare, and agricultural development. 
Most of the budgetary trade-offs with defense are not par-
ticularly strong, however, perhaps indicative of the fact that 
military regimes spread the needed non-defense reductions over 
a variety of sectors to accommodate increased allocations to 
the military. 
From the results above we can conclude that increased 
allocation~ to defense in military regimes do not come at the 
expense of allocations that would be making a major contribu-
tion to economic growth - the economic services are not 
significantly contracted nor is agriculture while transport 
appears to be a beneficiary of increased shares of the budget 
allocated to defense. 
Civilian regimes show a somewhat different pattern of 
defense/non-defense budgetary trade-offs. Civilian regimes 
appear much less likely to reduce social programs during periods 
of expanded defense expenditures than is the case with their 
military counterparts. In fact civilian regimes tend to increase a 
number of social programs in line with defense allocations -
total social expenditures, and welfare expenditures are both 
expanded in line with defense. These expanded budgetary 
shares appear to come at the expense of economic services, 
particularly funds allocated for agricultural development. In 
contrast to military regimes the transport sector does not 
appear to have a statistically signficant increase in its budgetary 
share during periods of expanded def~nse expenditures. In short 
regimes tend to protect social, particularly welfare expenditures 
during periods of expanded defense expenditures. These budge-
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( 1) public services 
r2 








1. 25 defense 
( 3. 36) 
0.58 public sector expenditures 
(-1.13) 
0.386; F = 5.72; DF = 20 
0.42 defense - 0.03 public sector expenditures 
( 1. 22) (-0. 06) 
0.08; F = 0.78 DF 20 




2.77; DF = 20 
0.05 defense - 0.15 public sector expenditures 
(-0. 19) (0. 38) 
r2 0.008; F = 0.08; DF = 20; 
(5) total economic 
expenditures 
-0.39 defense 
( -1. 88) 
0.05 public sector expenditures 
(-0.17) 




-0.10 defense 0.06 public sector expenditures 
(-0. 63) ( -1. 44) 
0.146; F 1. 55; DF = 20 
(7) transportation= 0.56 defense - 0.10 public sector expenditures 
( 4. 17) (-0.53) 
r2 0.495; F = 8.81; Df = 20 
For the civilian regimes the same tests yielded: 
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( 1') public service 
expenditures 
r2 






( 4') welfare 
expenditures 
r2 
( 5') economic 
expenditures 
r2 
( 6') agricultural 
development 
CHART ONE (Continued) 
0.66 defense 
(3.80) 
0.38 public sector expenditures 
( -1. 63) 
0.430; F = 8.68; DF = 26; 
0.56 defense 
( 2. 75) 
0.29 public sector expenditures 
(-1.06) 
0.269; F = 4.42; DF = 26; 
0.25 defense - 0.20 public sector expenditures 
( 1. 77) 
0.151; F 
( -1. 04) 
2.14; DF = 26; 
0.32 defense - 0. 10 public sector expenditures 
(2.94) (-0. 66) 
0.276; F = 4.58; DF = 26; 
-0.23 defense 
(-2. 24) 
0.25 public sector expenditures 
( -1. 74) 
0.247; F = 3.94; DF = 26; 
-o. 13 defense - 0.06 public sector expenditures 
(-2.87) (-0.94) 
r2 = 0.273; F = 4.51; DF = 26; 
( 7' ) transport 
development 
r2 
0. 13 defense - 0.87 public sector expenditure 
( 1. 86) 
0.152; F 
(-0. 87) 
2.15; DF = 26; 
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tary shares come largely at the expense of economic expendi-
tures, that presumably would contribute to over all economic 
growth. However, overall welfare of the civilian population 
may not decline appreciably during periods of increased d°dense 
expenditures. 
In contrast military regimes are less inclined to protect 
social expenditures during periods of military expansion -
health and education expenditures may in fact be increased, 
but this is not the case for welfare and social programs. On the 
.other hand, military regimes appear unwilling to sacrifice eco-
nomic allocations for the sake of increased defense budgets. In 
fact there appears to be a marked increase in allocations for 
transport development during these periods. The net effect of 
this budgetary pattern is undoubtedly little sacrifice of over all 
growth, but a decline in welfare during periods of defense 
build up. 
Conclusions 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, little integration 
has taken place between the body of analysis focused on 
the defense/growth issue and that dealing with defense/non-
defense budgetary trade-offs. Starting from the assumption that 
civilian atid military regimes are likely to have somewhat dif-
ferent budgetary priorities, the analysis above has shown that 
these two bodies of literature can be fruitfully merged to provide 
useful insights into the manner in which defense expenditures 
impact on Third World economies. 
Military expenditures tend to reduce economic growth in 
civilian regimes. The fact is however that civilian governments, 
perhaps due to voter resistance, tend to maintain and even 
expand a number of social programs during periods of military 
buildup. Economic allocations bear the brunt of expanded mili-
tary budgets. The net impact is one of increased military spend-
ing impacting negatively on growth. 
In contrast the military regimes, perhaps not as constrained 
by civilian opinion and preferences, tend to be less inclined to 
maintain social programs during periods of military buildup. 
This in turn allows military regimes the luxury of avoiding 
major cuts in economic allocation (and perhaps even an expan-
sion in some economic areas). The ti.et effect is that military 
regimes have not experienced reduced growth with higher 
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levels of military expenditures. 
Clearly there appears to be some contraint which the mere 
possession of a domestic arms industry places on the budgetary 
process in arms producing countries that is not present in 
non-arms producing countries. The nature of this contraint will, 
however, most likely not be understood with any degree of cer-
tainty until a number of detailed country studies are completed. 
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